Illicit trade and counterfeiting have become structurally cross‑border phenomena in Latin America. The networks behind this sprawling system operate across countries with speed and efficiency, redirecting regional routes at a moment’s notice to circumvent regulatory barriers and customs controls. In the region, these groups also take advantage of the fact that between 60% and 70% of illicit trade still moves through offline channels and informal markets, combining digital and physical circuits to expand their reach. Yet despite this clearly regional dynamic, many brands continue to address the issue with strictly local, country‑by‑country approaches—an increasingly ineffective model in the face of integrated criminal structures. This is a phenomenon that today costs brands up to USD 600 billion annually.

The fragmentation of enforcement strategies generates economic and operational consequences that are rarely reflected in initial budgets. When each country conducts its own monitoring, investigations, and evidentiary processes, fees multiply, tasks are duplicated, and partial diagnoses emerge that fail to capture the full scope of the issue. Dispersed information makes it difficult to identify regional routes, entry patterns, or recurring actors, and limits the ability to build common metrics that would allow brands to assess ROI, impact, or reaction times. The result is a patchwork of disconnected actions that, while well‑intentioned, seldom achieve sustained deterrence.

This lack of coordination becomes an opportunity for those who lead counterfeiting networks. In the Southern Cone, for instance, it is common to see illicit goods shifting between countries as controls tighten or authorities respond more quickly in one jurisdiction than another. Paraguay—due to its strategic location and its role as a transit and redistribution hub—offers a particularly clear example: when a neighboring country strengthens its controls, cargo simply reroutes through another Mercosur border. When companies act in isolation, these dynamics are detected too late, once damage has already spread across multiple markets.

The impact is not limited to brands. Between 20% and 30% of consumers unknowingly purchase counterfeit products, particularly in sensitive sectors such as pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, and automotive parts. The associated risks extend far beyond economic harm: mechanical failures, intoxications, dermatological reactions, dangerous adulterations, and, in extreme cases, life‑threatening consequences. Counterfeiting is not only a commercial offense—it is a public health and safety issue.

A regional urgency: matching the coordination of illicit networks

Latin America concentrates between 60% and 70% of illicit trade that still moves outside digital platforms, driven by informal markets, porous borders, and a geography that facilitates complex logistical routes. The common Asia–Southern Cone flow, combined with intraregional re‑exports, demonstrates both the adaptability of these networks and the need for responses that follow the same regional logic.

In this context, a country‑by‑country approach is not only inefficient—it is insufficient. The region requires unified strategies that harmonize legal and evidentiary criteria, establish risk‑based enforcement priorities, consolidate intelligence, and enable coordinated deterrent actions that disrupt multiple stages of the illicit supply chain at once. When enforcement is managed at a regional scale, it stops being a reactive response and becomes a genuine risk‑management tool capable of protecting trademarks, corporate reputation, and—above all—consumer safety.

Companies adopting this approach gain clear benefits: more predictable budgets, faster reaction times, improved understanding of illicit trade routes, and a significantly greater capacity to anticipate shifts in criminal behavior. Regional coordination not only reduces operational and legal costs—it also strengthens the effectiveness of every action taken.

But no company can tackle the territorial, regulatory, and operational complexity of this issue on its own. In an environment where counterfeiting operates without borders, brands need partners with territorial presence, direct experience with local authorities, and a deep understanding of national nuances and friction points. Working with allies capable of articulating a regional vision and executing it with local precision helps avoid formal errors that lead to failed seizures, strengthens relationships with customs agencies, and builds consolidated intelligence systems that feed stronger strategic decisions.

In an ecosystem where crime is organized as a network, the response can no longer be a sum of isolated efforts. If Latin America aims to reduce the impact of counterfeiting effectively, it must act with the same coordination, agility, and regional perspective shown by those who drive this. And it must do so through effective, well‑structured brand protection strategies. That is the transformation the region needs—and, given the scale of the challenge, the one it can no longer afford to postpone.